This paper argues for the central role of risk aversion in shaping political ideology.
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing political science literature posits more and more possible links between basic individual characteristics, such as personality traits, and political ideology and behavior (see, e.g., Mondak and Halperin 2008; Vecchione and Caprara 2009; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Morton, Tyran, and Wengstrom 2011) . Critics of this research enterprise point towards its reliance on correlations between personality measures and political outcomes (Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2012) . What is missing are clear theoretical frameworks linking basic individual characteristics to political ideology (Feldman 2012: 186) . In this paper we focus on the role of risk aversion and provide one possible theoretical (formal) mechanism linking it to ideology. We argue that risk aversion is linked to political ideology via an "economic" channel. An individual's level of risk aversion shapes how individuals translate labor market risks, such as income losses due to unemployment, into demand for social protection. 3 To test the predictions from our theoretical model we use survey data on individuals'
ideological position combined with experimentally validated risk aversion measures.
This allows us to test the importance of risk aversion with a large representative sample. We develop an explicit measure of risk aversion, which takes into account that survey-based risk aversion measures are imperfect and noisy, and include it in a model of individuals' ideology. Our results show that risk aversion is an important determinant of political attitudes and is at least as important as, if not more so, an individual's position in the income distribution.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide theory and evidence of the ideology effects of risk aversion in the political economy literature. 4 Risk aversion plays a fundamental role in this research program. For instance, Moene and Wallerstein (2001) argue that a decrease in inequality can increase support for redistribution as 3 This channel need not be exclusive. In both our theoretical and empirical models we allow for non-economic motivations. However, we do report evidence that social spending preferences are related to political ideology in the way our model assumes. We also find that income has a significant and substantive effect on ideology, in an identical way that is has on social spending or redistribution preferences. All of this gives us confidence that the "economic" channel linking risk aversion and political ideology is an important one. We furthermore note that whether risk aversion is endogenous to other factors, such as culture (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Wildavsky 1987) , is a question that remains outside of the scope of this present study. 4 For a recent analysis of the effects of risk aversion on political participation outside of the political economy literature, see Kam (2012) .
long as individuals are sufficiently risk averse. In particular, they assume a degree of risk aversion that implies that demand for social insurance will increase as income goes up. Consistent with this view, we find that greater risk aversion does indeed make a person more ideologically left-leaning. However, in contrast to their argument, we find that the effect of income on ideology is negative even when controlling for risk aversion. Nevertheless, we also do find some limited evidence that this negative effect weakens as individuals become more risk averse, which is consistent with our, as well as Moene and Wallerstein's (2001) , underlying behavioral model. These results do not challenge the role of risk aversion in individual (i.e., micro-level) social policy preferences, but they do question the macro-level argument that lower inequality can lead to more redistribution via risk preferences.
Risk aversion also plays a critical role in Iversen and Soskice (2001) . In that paper, individuals with more specific skills demand more social spending. In particular, their theory predicts that skill specificity, holding income constant, would have no effect on social policy preferences if individuals were not averse to risk, i.e., if they were risk neutral. Risk aversion is therefore essential to their asset theory of social policy preferences. While fully exploring the relationship between risk aversion and skill specificity is beyond the scope of this article, we find, in line with Iversen and Soskice, that risk aversion does indeed influence ideological commitments that align with more social spending.
Our political economy model also allows us to distinguish and relate our argument to a now growing literature on the role of economic risks in shaping support for social policies. For instance, Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2006) ; Rehm (2009 Rehm ( , 2011a and Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger (2012) have established convincing evidence that occupational unemployment risk is a critical factor shaping social policy preferences.
We agree that this research demonstrates that unemployment risk is related to the demand for social policy. However, as our political economy model makes clear, the effect of risk aversion is quite distinct from unemployment risk.
To see why this is the case, we provide a simple example. Consider two individuals, neither of whom faces any unemployment risk. Suppose individual A earns $40,000
per year, while B earns $30,000. All else equal, extensive theory and data would predict that B would prefer more redistribution than A, because she is poorer. Now consider individual C, who also makes $40,000 but is subject to a 25% chance of becoming unemployed, in which case she earns nothing. The expected income of C is 0.75 × $40, 000 = $30, 000. C would also prefer more redistribution than A, but in this case, because her expected income is lower. This is the effect that Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2006) and Rehm (2009 Rehm ( , 2011b identify.
Let us now introduce the idea of risk aversion. We can capture this idea formally with any concave utility function. To take a simple example, suppose a person values a dollar of income according to the following function: u($) = $. In this case, B values her expected income of $30,000 at 30, 000 = 173.20. In contrast, C values her identical expected income at 0.75 × 40, 000 = 150. Even though both B and C have identical expected income, B's utility is higher than C's. Notice that if C were making a bet, she would take the $30,000 with certainty, and forgo the three-quarters chance of getting $40,000 even though the expected value of the two bets is equal.
Indeed, C's refusal to accept a "fair bet," can help us understand the demand for social insurance. Suppose that C is employed and pays an insurance company $4,000-or that the government taxes C's income at a 10% rate-in exchange for the right to receive $4,000 if she becomes unemployed. This makes her expected utility 0.75 × 36, 000 + 0.25 × 4, 000 = 158.11. Having insurance improves C's utility over that without any insurance. But note that her expected income with insurance is now lower: 0.75 × $36, 000 + 0.25 × $4, 000 = $28, 000 < $30, 000. This underscores the importance of the concavity of the utility function: an individual values a dollar less when employed than when unemployed. She would therefore prefer to pay to have more income when unemployed.
These examples illustrate the distinct behavioral assumptions that differentiate the effects of unemployment risk from risk aversion on social policy preferences. This distinction is important because it is linked with very different explanations for the development of the welfare state. One potential theory explains the welfare state as a mechanism to redistribute income from rich to poor. Another views the welfare state as a vehicle for providing insurance to protect against social risks. Unemployment risk is therefore a redistributive motive: it increases the demand for social policy because it reduces expected income. In contrast, risk aversion is inherently an insurance motive:
it increases demand for social policy because increases the volatility of the expected stream of income. Moreover, without risk aversion, the reason that B and C in the examples above prefer more social spending is behaviorally equivalent: they are both poorer than A. In contrast, with risk aversion, C prefers more social spending than B, even though they have identical expected income.
The paper proceeds in the following order. In section II, we develop a formal model, with which we derive explicit hypotheses on the effects of risk aversion, income, and unemployment risk on social spending preferences and political ideology. In section III we translate our theoretical model into empirically testable language. In section IV we discuss our data and in section V specify our statistical models for risk aversion and ideology. Finally, we discuss our results in section VI.
II. MODEL
In this section we develop a formal model of the labor market, government policy, and political ideology. From this model, we then derive testable implications for how risk aversion, income, and unemployment risk influence individuals' social policy preferences.
Consider a continuum of individuals of size one, distinguished by two characteristics:
their productivity (or wage rate if the labor market is perfectly competitive), w, and their degree of risk aversion, σ. We assume that w ∈ W = R + and σ ∈ Σ = R + respectively have cumulative distribution G(w) and H(σ), positive probability density g(w) and h(σ), have finite expectation, and are i.i.d. Further, let s ∈ S = W × Σ. A type-s worker thus has characteristics (w, σ).
Each individual has a utility function over a set of policies, i ∈ N , N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, which we refer to as an individual's ideology. 5 In this conception, ideology is explicitly multidimensional. However, in many cases, individuals must make single-dimensional choices, such as choosing between a left versus a right politician in an election or, as in our dependent variable, a self-placement on a left-right ideological scale. Therefore, the utility, V s , of an individual with characteristics s over the n-dimensional policy space takes the form:
5 Our definition of ideology collapses the distinction between that term and an individual's policy preferences. Without altering results, we could retain this nuance by using a model proposed by Hinich and Munger (1992) or Hinich and Munger (1996) . 
The label for this functional form comes from the fact that the coefficient of risk aversion is constant relative to consumption: σ = −cu (c)/u (c). employed workers (χ = 1), fiscal policy to an important extent is purely redistributive. 7 On the other hand, when transfers are targeted specifically to the unemployed (χ = 0), government transfers come in the form of social insurance. The government is subject to a balanced budget constraint:
wherez represents the mean income of income-earning (i.e., employed) workers:
Letting b E be the size of the transfer going to employed workers,q ≡ σ w q s dG(w)dH(σ) the average employment rate, b N the size of the transfer going to unemployed workers, and 1 −q the average unemployment rate, we can decompose the budget constraint (3) into its separate components:
Since by definitionqb E = χτz and (1 −q)b N = (1 − χ)τz we can solve for the transfer to each group:
Thus, all revenue goes to employed workers when χ = 1, but goes to all unemployed workers when χ = 0. In contrast to these two scenarios, transfers are universal when χ =q.
When employed, workers earn income, y, by supplying labor, l ∈ [0, ∞). Specifically, y = wl. However, supplying labor is also costly. The cost of supplying labor is C(l), with the cost of labor measured in units of the consumption good and where C(·)
is an increasing and strictly convex function, with C(0) = 0 and lim l→∞ C (l) = ∞.
Taking all of this together, the consumption of an employed worker is:
while the consumption of an unemployed worker is:
Putting all of this together, we assume that individuals' expected consumption utility takes the form of:
To summarize the model, the timing of events is as follows:
1. Individuals choose their policy positions,
given their ideal points,
2. An individual's social spending ideal point,
, is determined by choosing a tax rate, τ, to maximize her expected consumption utility, U(w, σ), subject to a balanced-budget constraint, which allocates the revenue to employed workers, b E , and unemployed workers, b N , according to the share χ.
3. When employed, workers choose how much labor to supply, l, to maximize their utility u(c E ).
A. Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the model is characterized by workers' optimal choices of l, τ, and their policy preferences x i . For each individual, it is straightforward to show that these choices exist and are unique. We do this in Proposition 2 in the Appendix, but offer the intuition here.
By backward induction, we start with workers' choice of labor supply. Labor supply is increasing in workers' productivity, so more productive workers supply more labor and earn higher incomes. Also, labor supply is decreasing in the tax rate. This fact creates a disincentive effect which ensures that no individual chooses a tax rate larger than one. This choice of the tax rate captures workers' social spending preferences. 
B. Comparative Statics
We now turn to the comparative statics of the model. Specifically, this section analyzes implications of risk aversion, income, and unemployment for political ideology.
Proposition 1. (Political ideology). The effect of risk aversion (σ), income ( y), and
follows: To anticipate our empirical analysis, we focus mainly on the pure income effect in order to compare our results to the effects of risk aversion, as well as other research.
(Risk aversion). Holding income and unemployment risk constant, a greater degree of risk aversion (larger σ) makes a person more left-leaning (larger x
* ) for all χ < 1.
(Income). Holding risk aversion and unemployment risk constant, a) (Transfers
However, the interaction effect between income and risk aversion is also substantively interesting and important. For example, Moene and Wallerstein (2001) assume that all individuals are sufficiently risk averse so that preferences for social insurance will be increasing in income. This assumption is critical for their (macro-level)
political economy argument that a reduction in inequality can lead to an increase in redistribution. We therefore also examine this interaction effect in a subsequent section of the empirical analysis.
Part 3 serves primarily to distinguish our focus on risk aversion from an analysis based on occupational unemployment risk. Our model predicts that an increase in unemployment risk makes a person more left-leaning through her social spending preferences. Regardless of how transfers are targeted, the fundamental mechanism is the same: higher risk of unemployment reduces expected income. A higher risk of unemployment makes expected income closer to the individual's unemployed income, which is lower than her income when employed. Thus, when the expectation of unemployment increases, it is not risk aversion, but expectations of lower income that induce an increased demand for social spending.
III. TESTING THE MODEL
In this section, we translate our theoretical results into a statistical model. Using the first-order condition of an individual's utility in equation (7), we implicitly obtain a function for a person's location in ideological space, x * s (σ, y), via her ideal social spending policy preferences (τ * ), as a function of her level of risk aversion, σ, and her income, y. The first-order Taylor expansion of x * s (σ, y) is:
where r is a list of some additional implications (based on previous research) that we control for. Thus, our regression equation takes the form:
where z i is an individual's ideological position. Our empirical individual-level measure of risk aversion is denoted by ψ i , and its coefficient corresponds with our central theoretically-derived hypotheses of Proposition 1:
if γ is larger than zero, both statistically and substantively, we obtain support for the expectation that ∂ x * s /∂ σ > 0 from Part 1 of Proposition 1. Likewise, if δ is less than zero, our expectation is confirmed that ∂ x * s /∂ y < 0 from Part 2.
Our dependent variable is an individual's ideology, i.e., his or her position on a left-right dimension. We assume that more left positions imply a stronger preference for welfare spending and redistribution. Our argument has general implications for welfare and spending preferences. Thus we opt for using a broad explanandum instead of the more commonly used more specific question on redistribution preferences (which focuses narrowly on the rich-poor income gap). Indeed, a question about redistribution and inequality may not capture a risk view of social policy preferences, which has a fundamentally different behavioral foundation, as we have argued. labor market activities, such as income, work experience, and unemployment spells. What makes this study ideal for our purpose, is that in 2009 it includes a detailed measurement instrument of risk aversion. It consists of a set of items assessing the extent to which individuals engage in risky behaviors in different contexts. Using risk measures as part of a large-scale panel study allows us to study the effect of risk aversion in a proper random sample allowing inference to the total population.
10
However, compared to a laboratory experiment, our measure of risk aversion might be both less reliable and less valid. The latter concern is alleviated by an explicit 8 Our ideal question would be one about social spending, since it would be broad enough to capture both redistributive and insurance motives. In the absence of that, we believe our ideology measure to be the next best alternative. 9 For more information on the SOEP contents and structure see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) and Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007) . 10 Furthermore, an advantage of using a survey measurement instrument is that it allows us to derive individual risk preferences without having to recover behavioral parameters using (arbitrary) identifying assumptions. The downside of our survey-based measures of risk is that they are not incentive compatible, a problem that is overcome by laboratory experiments where real money is at stake (for a discussion see e.g., Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Holt and Laury 2002) . We alleviate this concern by using a behaviorally validated survey instrument combined with an explicit measurement model. validation study, which tested the survey measures using a field experiment. The former is explicitly addressed in our model. We construct a covariate measurement error model (Wansbeek and Meijer 2000) , which takes into account the limited reliability of survey based measures of risk aversion.
We select our sample as follows. (Dohmen et al. 2005 ). Thus, they are "uniquely valid instruments" (Dohmen et al. 2005: 18) capturing individual heterogeneity in risk preferences (and actual risk-taking).
11 The exact question wording is "How would you assess your preparedness to take risks in the following areas...?" 12 The field experimental sample was obtained using the random walk method, using face-to-face interviews with CAPI between June and July 2005.
Ideology. Our dependent variable is the standard measure of ideology, similar to the one used in ANES. It asks individuals to place themselves on an 11-point scale with labeled endpoints, ranging from "far left" (0) to "far right" (10). 13 We reverse this scale so that higher values represent left positions.
14 Individual characteristics We do not include a huge number of "control variables" in our models, to avoid Achen's (2005) The actual question text is: "In politics, people often talk about "left" and "right" when describing different political views. When you think about your own political view, how would you rate them on the scale below?". 14 We validate that the left-right variable used here does have significant economic content. We use 2,519 cases from the German portion of the European Social survey, which includes both a left-right measure similar to the one used in this paper as well as a measure of redistribution preferences widely used in politico-economic research. Using a scaled ordered logit model (Anderson 1984) we relate redistribution preferences to the left-right scale. The relationship between left-right position and redistribution preferences is highly significant. The estimated effect of left-right position on redistribution preferences is 0.485 with a standard error of 0.084. 15 Union membership was not assessed in the panel wave used in our analysis. Therefore, we matched this information from an earlier interview (two waves prior).
variables problem (Chesher 1991) . We solve this by adjoining a measurement system (Fuller 1987: ch.4 (Jackman 2009: ch.9 ).
We stack available risk measures for each individual into a length-J vector x i = (x i1 , . . . , x iJ ) and model x i as a function of ψ i via the following linear system:
Here µ is a vector of means (or intercepts), while λ is a length J vector of coefficients relating changes in ψ i to changes in x i . Finally, ε i is a vector of regression residuals.
16
The measurement system is completed by assigning a distribution to the latent variable or random coefficient, ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ N ) . Following established convention we use a normal distribution centered at zero: ψ ∼ N (0, ω).
17
To identify the model both scale and orientation of ψ need to be set (Anderson and Rubin 1956; Wansbeek and Meijer 2000: 208) . This can be achieved by fixing the variance, ω, and putting inequality constraints on one of the elements of λ, which is the strategy used in most ideal-point models (e.g., Quinn 2004) . Alternatively, if we put a scalar restriction on one of the elements of λ, we identify both the orientation and the scale of our latent risk measure (which is then on the same scale as our 16 We assume that C ov(ε i j , ε ik )∀ j, k, i.e., the standard assumption that, conditional on the latent variable, measurements are independent (Jackman 2008) . 17 See Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004) for a general discussion of random coefficient/factor models. measures). 18 We follow the latter strategy and fix λ 1 = 1. Thus, a higher value of ψ i implies that an individual is less prepared to take risk in several areas of life, in other words, she is more risk averse.
Before proceeding to our model for ideology, we address an objection to our measurement strategy. A critical reader might argue that assuming a normal distribution for latent risk aversion is an arbitrary choice. While there is research arguing for this choice on the grounds of its robustness against misspecification (Bartholomew 1988; Wedel and Kamakura 2001) , note that this assumption is not necessary for our model. Jettisoning the normal distribution assumption, we also estimate f (ψ)
semi-parametrically by approximating it using a finite mixture of normals (Ferguson 1983) :
Here φ(·) is the normal density, and π is discrete with mass at (µ k , σ 2 ). To insure discussion. In our empirical application we set K = 3 to produce a non-parametric estimate of f (ψ) in addition to the one based on the normal distribution described above. With these ψ i estimates in hand we can proceed to estimate the relationship between risk aversion and ideology.
B. Ideology
For each individual i we have a scalar measure of ideology, y i , her income, w i , and a vector of social characteristics, z i . We model the relationship between risk aversion, ψ i , and ideology using the following specification:
Here γ is the regression coefficient associated with the risk aversion effect, ∂ x * s /∂ σ, and δ corresponds to the income effect ∂ x * s /∂ w. Systematic differences in social characteristics of individuals are captured by coefficient vector β. Finally, υ i are white noise residuals distributed N (0, σ 2 ).
C. Estimation
We implement the model in a fully Bayesian framework (Gill 2014; Jackman 2009 ), which allows for straightforward estimation of all ψ i and fully takes into account the uncertainty arising from our measurement of risk aversion. We estimate our system of measurement equations in (10) jointly with equation (11). Our Bayesian specification is completed by assigning prior distributions to all free model parameters. We choose vague or "uniformative" prior values for all model parameters so that our results do not depend on prior information (see appendix A.4 for details). The joint model can be estimated via Gibbs sampling. We ran two chains for 40,000 iterations discarding the first 10,000 as transient phase of the Gibbs sampler. 19 All results reported below are based on the remaining 30,000 posterior samples.
VI. RESULTS

A. Risk aversion
We start by discussing results from our measurement of risk aversion. Table 1 shows parameter estimates (posterior means) together with an interval measure of uncertainty -90% highest posterior density regions -in brackets. 20 The first two columns, labeled ψ (P) show estimates based on our parametric model with an assumed normal distribution on latent risk aversion, while the last remaining two columns, labeled ψ (N P) , display non-parametric estimates.
We find strong evidence that latent levels of risk aversion drive observed (or, more precisely, reported) levels of risk aversion. Estimates in columns λ j , which show the 19 Standard diagnostics did not indicate any convergence issues and Monte Carlo standard errors (i.e., simulation noise) was an order of magnitude smaller than our estimates. 20 A region R is a 100(1 − α) percent HPD region for parameter θ if (1) P(θ ∈ R) = 1 − α and (2) P(θ 1 ) ≥ P(θ 2 ) for all θ 1 ∈ R and θ 2 / ∈ R, i.e., it yields an interval estimate with the added requirement that each value in the interval is larger than those outside of it (Gill 2014: 46 
B. Ideology
Estimates The role risk aversion plays in shaping ideology is demonstrated in Table 2. It shows parameter estimates for equation (11) together with their 90% HPD regions for a range of model specifications. 21 Our baseline model (1) simply includes a respondents income as distance from the country mean. In line with recent political economy research on micro-level preferences, higher income distance is associated with a more conservative political outlook (and once more underscores the strong economic content of our dependent variable). Model (2) proceeds to a test of our argument, by including our (parametric) estimates of individuals' risk aversion. Holding income distance constant, we find a positive effect of risk aversion, indicating that more risk averse individuals are more left-leaning. We will explore the substantive magnitude of this below; for now we note that the relationship clearly is statistically different from zero, as indicated by the HPD region bound away from zero. When using a non-parametric estimate of risk aversion in model (3) we reach a strikingly similar conclusion, indicating that our core result does not depend on the assumption of normally distributed latent risk aversion.
Our previous three models included controls for basic individual differences, such as age, gender, education, and growing up in the former GDR. We obtain the same result for the role of risk aversion when excluding all covariates. Moving towards the other extreme, model (4) includes an extended set of covariates, which have been found to influence ideology, including indicator variables of current unemployment, being member of a trade union, or self-employed, being of non-German nationality, hours worked, previous experience of unemployment, and household size. While their inclusion clearly increases endogeneity issues, we argue that even after conditioning on these characteristics individuals are still highly heterogeneous with respect to their level of risk aversion. Accordingly, model (4) shows a remarkably similar estimate for risk aversion, with a slightly increased uncertainty, as evidenced by the wider HPD region.
Before examining the substantive size of the risk aversion effect vis-à-vis income, we perform another strict test of our central hypotheses, formulated in Proposition 1. Table 3 shows Bayesian p-values, which represent directional (one-sided) tests of our income and risk aversion hypotheses. It strongly confirms our results from Table 2: our predictions regarding risk aversion are strongly supported by the current evidence.
Substantive magnitude In order to assess the substantive magnitude of the influence of risk aversion on ideology we compare its effect to that of income. In Figure 2 we calculate marginal effects at each decile of the respective distribution of income and risk aversion (based on estimates of model 2). Our results show the expected marked negative effect of income, which is especially apparent at higher deciles of the income distribution. However, and perhaps surprisingly for a variable far less tangible than income, risk aversion matters just as much. As Figure 2 shows, increasing risk aversion leads to more leftist ideological positions. The magnitude of this effect rivals that of income.
C. Risk-dependent income effect
In addition to the test of our core prediction of the role of risk aversion, we examine a further implication of our model concerning the effect of income on preferences.
The vast majority of political-economic models of preference formation treat the effect of income on preferences or ideology as homogeneous over individuals (as did we in the previous section). However, from Proposition 1 we derived the expectation of an income effect heterogeneous in risk aversion. More precisely, we predict that the effect of income on ideology decreases in absolute value monotonously with increasing risk aversion. To study this prediction we replace the income term, δw i in our ideology equation in (11) marginal income effects at different levels of risk aversion with their associated 90% HPD regions.
While there is considerable uncertainty around the marginal effect estimates, Figure 3 still illustrates that the income effect is heterogeneous in risk aversion. In line with the prediction from our model, as risk aversion increases, the effect of income on ideology weakens. For individuals with low levels of risk aversion (say one standard deviation below the population mean, ψ i < −1.6) we find a strong negative marginal effect of income, while for highly averse individuals (ψ i > 1.6) the income effect is reduced considerably. In fact, for individuals with extreme levels of risk aversion (ψ i > 2) the effect of income on ideology is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
This finding has wider implications for existing political economic models invoking risk aversion. Remember that our results are based on a large-scale population sample, which is arguably better suited to detect high levels of risk aversion (than, say, a lab experiment involving students). Still, we do not find that individuals are so risk averse that an increase in income can increase support for social spending or induce a 
D. Robustness tests
To study the robustness of our results we conducted several additional analyses.
Occupational risk So far we have developed our analysis focusing on the central role of risk aversion controlling for a number of covariates. One factor receiving considerable attention in the recent literature is occupation-specific risk of unemployment (Rehm 2009; Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006 ), which we have not included in our analysis. In Part 3 of Proposition 1 we show that risk aversion emerges as a distinct factor shaping preferences. In other words, we should find a substantively strong effect of risk aversion even when accounting for occupational unemployment risk. This is borne out empirically. Studying the distribution of risk aversion in occupational groups (not shown here), we do indeed find that at each level of occupational unemployment individuals are still highly heterogeneous in their levels of risk aversion. For a stricter statistical test, we include a direct measure of occupational unemployment risk (Rehm 2009; Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006) . 22 Our results show that, while occupational unemployment risk emerges as a significant factor shaping ideology, risk aversion remains highly relevant. Our estimate of risk aversion is 0.050±0.011.
Second dimension issues
We have developed our analytical model explicitly allowing for the fact that an individual's ideology is possibly shaped by many considerations.
One of these are spending preferences, whose dependency on risk aversion we have modeled systematically. As long as an increase in spending preferences yields a (left)
shift in ideology we can analyze the effect of risk aversion. However, one might argue that an important conflicting element of ideology are values and moral considerations.
While we do not have direct measures of these, we include religion as proxy to capture non-economic aspects of an individual's ideological position. 23 To the extent that religion is related to moral or value-based ideological considerations, we can capture this effect. Our results show that (as expected) religion does have an effect on ideology, but even after its inclusion risk aversion still emerges as highly relevant.
Our estimated effect of risk aversion is 0.049±0.011.
Wealth In our previous analyses we only included an individuals current income, thus 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we establish the importance of risk aversion in shaping political ideology. We provide an explicit formal, political economy model that links the 22 We measure occupational unemployment risk following Rehm (2009) by calculating occupational risk of unemployment from Labor force survey data. For each 2-digit occupation (ISCO) groups, we estimate the proportion of unemployed individuals. Our estimation takes into account survey sample inclusion probabilities. 23 We measure religion using an individual's denominational self-categorization, i.e., if she considers herself either Catholic, Protestant, member of another faith, or no faith at all.
two ends of this relationship through an "economic" channel. Our argument is that more risk averse individuals demand more social spending to address risks, such as unemployment risk in the labor market. A greater demand for social spending in turn shifts individuals' ideological location to the left in the political spectrum.
We provide evidence to support this argument. Our results support the conclusion that risk aversion is strongly related, both substantively and statistically, to individuals' political-ideological position on a left-right scale. This effect is robust to a variety of controls and specifications. The magnitude of the effect of risk aversion is approximately as strong as a person's income on political ideology. We also uncover some more limited evidence that the negative effect of income weakens as individuals become more risk averse, which is consistent with what our formal model predicts.
These findings, and the consistent relationship between redistribution preferences and ideology, give us some confidence that the "economic" mechanism we specify in our formal model is a plausible one.
Some important implications follow from our findings. Most importantly, our results examine the essential, but hitherto untested, assumption of risk aversion in core models of political economy. For instance, risk aversion is a critical ingredient in social insurance and skill specificity arguments for redistribution in respectively Moene and Wallerstein (2001) and Iversen and Soskice (2001) . Our results support the assumption of risk aversion in both models. But we do not find (empirically) the extreme levels of risk aversion necessary to change the sign of an individual's income effect as hypothesized in Moene and Wallerstein (2001) .
Finally, another virtue of our formal model is that we are able to distinguish precisely the effects of risk aversion from those of unemployment risk. This later variable is the focus of much recent research . We do not wish to challenge the importance of unemployment risk this research uncovers (Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006; Rehm 2009 Rehm , 2011b Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012 We begin at the final stage of the model. Only employed workers supply labor, so each employed worker chooses l to maximize utility u(c E ) subject to her consumption (5), and taking taxes and transfers as given. Taking the derivative of this equation
and setting it equal to zero, leads to the unique equilibrium value of labor supply for each type:
Existence and uniqueness is ensured by the convexity of C(·). Convexity of C(·) also implies that l * w is increasing in l, decreasing in τ. Also note that l * w does not depend on σ. Hence, we subscript with w rather than s. For the same reason we will write income as y w = wl * w
. Finally we will assume that C −1 l (·) is a weakly concave function, which will ensure that the second-order conditions are straightforwardly met.
We turn now to workers' social spending preferences. The program is:
subject to the consumption constraints (5) and (6) and the government budget constraint (4). Applying the envelope theorem, this gives the first-order condition for τ as
Two implications should be clear from this first-order condition. First,z > 0 represents the marginal benefit of the transfer and τz τ < 0 represents the marginal cost. Second, since − y w < 0, satisfing the first-order condition requires (z + τz τ ) − y w ≤ 0 and (z + τz τ ) ≥ 0. These implications will be important for the proofs that follow.
To give the first-order condition some intuition, let ξ(z, τ) ≡z τ (τ/z) < 0 be the elasticity of public funds with respect to the tax rate. Then when social spending is targeted to the unemployed (χ = 0), after rearranging (14) the optimal level of social spending τ * s is given by:
When transfers are universal (χ =q), the first-order condition can be rearranged to
give:
Finally, when transfers are targeted to employed workers (χ = 1), the first-order condition is: 
Beginning with the effects of risk aversion, differentiate equation (14) with respect to σ to get:
This equation is identical to (14) except the ln(·) terms and the possible changes in sign. Therefore, since c E ≥ c N is always true and implies ln(c E ) ≥ ln(c N ), the entire expression is always positive. 24 Note that in the case χ = 1, equation (18) becomes
which from the first-order condition in that case, (1/q)(z + τz τ ) − y w = 0, must be zero. Intuitively, risk aversion plays no role in social-policy preferences when transfers have no insurance element to them. Thus, except in this limiting case, an increase in risk aversion always increases social spending preferences: ∂ τ * s /∂ σ > 0.
Turning to income, differentiate equation (14) with respect to y w and write:
using the fact that σ = −cu (c)/u (c) and where,
Moene and Wallerstein (2001) call µ the elasticity of consumption when working with respect to 1 − τ. Start with the case χ = 0, which makes µ in equation (20), 24 Note in particular that the term on the left of (18) is positive for all c E ≥ 1 and larger in absolute value than the term on the right, which is nonpositive for all c N ≥ 1. For all c E ≥ 1 and all 0 ≤ c N < 1, the whole expression is positive. Finally, for all 0 ≤ c E < 1 and all 0 ≤ c N < 1 the term on the left is negative and smaller in absolute value than the term on the right, which is positive, which again makes the entire expression positive. Finally, for χ = 1, this value of χ implies from the first-order condition that (1/q)(z + τz τ ) − y w = 0. Hence, (19) is negative for χ = 1 and ∂ τ * s /∂ y w < 0 for all σ.
Finally, we examine the effects of employment and unemployment. Differentiating equation (14) with respect to q s we obtain:
which is negative by the first-order condition. Note that for χ = 1, this expression is equal to zero, so some universality is again essential for unemployment risk to influence social spending preferences. Thus, s's ideal tax rate is decreasing in her employment rate, and therefore increasing in her unemployment rate: ∂ τ * s /∂ (1−q s ) ≥ 0 for all χ < 1.
A.3. Data details
Descriptive statistics Missing responses are particularly problematic when trying to assess an individuals wealth (especially if nonresponse is systematically related to certain wealth components). SOEP provides imputation (accounting for selection effects) of all wealth components using detailed respondent information. For an extensive documentation see Frick, Grabka, and Marcus (2007) . Here we use a simple aggregate of all imputed values.
Figure A.1 plots the kernel density estimate of wealth in our sample. 
